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At a glance 
 
x The UK economy continues to outperform expectations with growth in 2016 of 1.8% and a 
consensus forecast of near 2.0% growth in 2017.  
 
x Scottish growth in 2016 is likely to come in around our post-EU referendum forecast of just 
1.0%. Recent business surveys have started to show a pick-up in activity although overall 
conditions are still fragile.     
 
x There remains a high degree of uncertainty around all economic forecasts at this time. In 
particular, the range of possible outcomes is much wider than normal given the number of 
µELJ¶SROLWLFDOHYHQWV± not least the Brexit negotiations and the prospects for a 2nd 
independence referendum ± that cast a shadow over the outlook. 
 
x The long-WHUPLPSOLFDWLRQVRI6FRWWLVKLQGHSHQGHQFHDQGWKH8.¶VGHSDUWXUHIURPWKH(U will 
be debated at length over the next 18+ months. Irrespective of the final outcome, the 
negotiation and referendum processes themselves will add an additional layer of uncertainty 
for business and act as a possible headwind to short-term growth prospects.  
 
x In such uncertain times, we continue to recommend that just as much attention is given to the 
range of estimates that underpin this outlook as well as our central estimates. Our central 
forecast is for growth of 1.2% in 2017, 1.3% in 2018 and 1.4% in 2019.   
 
FAI forecast Scottish GVA growth (%) by sector, 2017 to 2019 
 
2017 2018 2019 
GVA 1.2 1.3 1.4 
Production 1.4 1.5 1.6 
Construction 0.7 0.8 0.8 
Services 1.2 1.3 1.4 
 
 
 
Forecast Scottish unemployment, 2017 to 2019 
2017 2018 2019 
Unemployment  131,900 141,350 166,300 
Rate (%)1 5.0 5.3 6.1 
Note: Rounded to the nearest 50. 1 = Rate calculated as total ILO 
unemployment by total economically active population 16+. 
 
 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute  
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Summary 
Our recent economic forecasts and analysis 
of the Scottish economy have been set 
against a period of significant uncertainty.  
Political uncertainty is not unusual and for 
the most part, businesses and investors are 
used to dealing with changes in government 
priorities and indeed governments. 
However, the current level of such 
uncertainty is unprecedented. It is also 
different from normal in that the debates 
around Brexit and a possible further 
independence referendum concern the 
fundamental basis on which the Scottish 
economy has grown and developed over the 
last 40 years.  
That being said, with so little clarity around 
PDQ\EXVLQHVVHVDSSHDUWREHµORRNLQJ
WKURXJKWKHXQFHUWDLQW\¶DQGDUHFRQWLQXLQJ
to press ahead with day-to-day activities.  
Whilst the Scottish economy continues to 
lag the rest of the UK, a number of recent 
business surveys point to a welcome pick-up 
in activity toward the end of 2016 and into 
2017. 
However, consumers appear wary about the 
outlook. Indicators of Scottish consumer 
confidence are much more negative than for 
the UK as a whole.  
It would appear that this, and not just the 
challenges in the North Sea, is one of the 
NH\UHDVRQVIRU6FRWODQG¶VUHODWLYHO\ZHDNHU
recent performance.  
On balance, we forecast that the Scottish 
economy will continue to grow over the 
forecast horizon and more quickly than in 
2016. The weight of probability suggests 
that it is likely to remain below-trend as 
policy uncertainties act as a headwind on 
growth.  
The Scottish labour market continues to hold 
up remarkably well. Employment rates are 
close to record highs, whilst the current 
unemployment rate of 4.7% is well below its 
long-run average.  
However with a rise in inactivity over the 
year, weak earnings growth and reduced 
average hours worked, the underlying 
picture is less positive than the headline 
figures suggest.  
Ultimately, whilst the policy focus will 
undoubtedly be dominated by ongoing 
debates around the EU and Scottish 
independence, it is important not to lose 
sight of the importance of domestic 
economic policies.  
Over the ten years since the start of the 
financial crisis in 2007, the Scottish 
economy has grown by just under 7% - 
equivalent to an average annual growth rate 
of 0.7% (less than a third of its long-term 
trend). GDP per head is just 2% higher over 
the same ten year period and the incomes of 
many households remain worse off.   
Strategies, action plans and ambitions 
around inclusive growth will only take us so 
far.  What really matters are clear practical 
policy actions to support businesses, boost 
productivity, attract investment and create 
jobs.   
A renewed focus on how both the Scottish 
and UK Governments can use the current 
powers at their disposal to support the 
Scottish economy is needed.  
 
 
 
 
Fraser of Allander Institute 
March 2017 
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Outlook and Appraisal 
 
1H[WPRQWK¶VVWDWLVWLFVDUHOLNHO\WRFRQILUPWKDWWKH6FRWWLVKHFRQRP\JUHZE\MXVW
in 2016. With growth of 1.2% in 2015, the Scottish economy has now been stuck in a 
low-growth cycle for nearly two years. With the triggering of Article 50, and plans for a 
IXUWKHULQGHSHQGHQFHUHIHUHQGXPWKH6FRWWLVKHFRQRP\¶VUHVLOLHQFHLVOLNHO\WREH
further tested over the next year.   
Table 1: Scottish growth (%) by sector, Q3 2016 
 
GDP Agriculture Production Construction Services 
Q3 +0.2 +0.5 -0.1 -1.4 +0.4 
UK  
 
+0.6 -0.7 -0.4 -0.8 +1.0 
Annual +0.7 +1.4 -2.9 -5.8 +2.1 
UK +2.2 -1.7 +1.1 +1.7 +3.1 
Source: Scottish Government 
 
 
 
Chart 1: Scottish economic growth ± since 2013 
 
Source: Scottish Government  
 
 
Table 2: Labour market, Nov-Jan 2017 
 
Employment 
(16-64) 
Unemployment 
(16+) 
Inactivity 
(16-64) 
Scotland 73.7 4.7 22.6 
England 74.9 4.7 21.3 
Wales 73.3 4.4 23.3 
N. Ire 69.4 5.7 26.2 
UK 74.6 4.7 21.6 
Source: ONS 
 
 
Introduction 
The Scottish economy grew by +0.2% over the 3- 
months to September 2016.  
Whilst this was the first official GDP data since the 
Brexit vote, there is little evidence that the 
referendum was to blame. 
Indeed, the UK continues to beat expectations with 
the data suggesting that ± if anything ± the UK 
economy actually picked-up somewhat in the 2nd 
half of 2016.  
We expect Scottish growth to come in during 2016 
at close to our post-referendum forecast of near 
1.0%.  
The labour market has weakened somewhat, with 
Scotland now slightly worse-off than the UK on key 
indicators. On the plus side, this provides a degree 
of spare capacity to support growth prospects 
should demand pick-up in the months ahead. And 
overall, unemployment rates are near record lows.    
Most indicators suggest that the Scottish economy 
continued to grow ± albeit at a relatively fragile 
pace ± through the final months of 2016 and into 
2017.  
The improved near term outlook for the UK should 
help and provide a welcome source of external 
demand (Scotland exports around £12bn of goods 
and services to rUK each quarter).   
The outlook for Scotland will be shaped by a series 
of major political events over the next few months. 
On balance, we continue to believe that the 
Scottish economy will grow this year and next, 
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although the pattern of growth could be anything 
but smooth.   
Table 3: An improving global outlook ± Growth Forecasts 
 
2016 2017 2018 
World Output 3.1 3.4 3.6 
G7 1.6 1.9 2.0 
US 1.6 2.3 2.5 
Euro Area 1.7 1.6 1.6 
Emerging & Developing 4.1 4.5 4.8 
China 6.7 6.5 6.0 
World Trade 1.9 3.8 4.1 
Source: IMF 
 
 
Chart 2: Recovery in Europe continues ± economic 
sentiment on upward trend (> 100 +ve sentiment) 
 
Source: European Commission  
 
 
Chart 3: Commodity Prices projected to remain flat ± with 
over supply of oil continue to support low oil prices  
 
 
Source: World Bank, Thomson Reuters Datastream  
 
 
 
The global economy 
After a relatively weak 2016, most predictions are 
more positive for world growth in 2017 and 2018.  
As with our own forecasts, there is a wide range of 
possible outcomes, particularly given the policy 
uncertainties surrounding the Trump administration 
and how major international players ± such as 
China ± choose to respond.   
The projected fiscal stimulus in the US is likely to 
propel it to faster growth in the near-term, but at 
the expense of rising interest rates (which will have 
knock-on impacts on emerging and global financial 
markets). More worrying are the long-term 
consequences of a rush toward protectionism 
which can only harm global growth in the long-run.  
The Chinese economy continues to move toward a 
more sustainable growth trajectory. How well 
controlled this is remains open to question. Amid 
heightened worries over debt and financial risk, 
tough new reforms are being implemented. Growth 
is projected to be at its slowest rate in over 25 
years. The potential for a sharper slowdown than 
planned, is a key risk facing the global economy.   
The recovery in Europe ± home to over 40% of 
Scottish international exports ± continues. 
Germany was the fastest growing economy in the 
G7 in 2016. And for the first time in almost a 
decade, the economies of all EU member states 
are expected to see positive annual growth in 2017 
and 2018. Major challenges remain, including 
ongoing painful structural reforms. At the same 
time, the current high levels of unemployment and 
low wage growth will take years to escape.   
Commodity ± and in particular energy ± prices are 
forecast to remain relatively weak over the medium 
term (and well below levels seen at the turn of the 
decade). Oil has stabilised at around $50 to $55 
per barrel: a price which is unlikely to usher in a 
new wave of investment to the North Sea. But with 
the fall in Sterling boosting profits (as oil is priced 
in dollars), it may be sufficient to counter some of 
the slowdown in activity provided that costs remain 
low and the tax environment becomes more 
favourable. 
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Chart 4: UK growth accelerated post EU referendum 
 
Source: ONS, Thomson Reuters Datastream  
 
 
Chart 5: But growth unbalanced ± all coming from 
consumption  
 
 
Source: ONS, Thomson Reuters Datastream  
 
 
Chart 6: Consumption supported by higher household 
income ± but increasingly reliant on savings and borrowing  
 
 
Source: ONS, Thomson Reuters Datastream  
 
 
The UK Economy 
The UK economy has held up remarkably well post 
the EU referendum. Growth has been close to its 
long-term average and if anything, the data shows 
the UK economy strengthening in the 2nd half of 
the year.  
In the end, the financial market volatility and 
uncertainty observed during the summer ± 
including in key business surveys ± failed to 
materialise into real economic data.   
There are a number of reasons for this, not least 
the decisive action taken by the Bank of England 
to shore up financial markets. Stronger momentum 
in global activity, higher global equity prices, more 
supportive credit conditions particularly for 
households and the first sustained rise in real 
earnings since the financial crisis, have all helped. 
Moreover, it would appear that with so many 
different scenarios now possible, many consumers 
DQGEXVLQHVVHVKDYHVRIDUFKRVHQWRµORRN
WKURXJKWKHXQFHUWDLQW\¶DQGFRQWLQXHGD\-to-day 
operations as planned. How long this will continue 
with Article 50 triggered remains to be seen.  
As Chart 5 highlights, the source of the better than 
expected UK economic data over the last year has 
been robust growth in consumption. Indeed, 
household spending has been responsible for the 
entire net growth in the UK economy during 2016.  
Some of this reflects a pick-up in real household 
incomes. But more recently, a significant driver 
has been a drawing down of savings and an 
increase in borrowing. Indeed the UK savings rate 
is now close to record lows. This appears to be 
driven by improved expectations for the economy, 
robust house price growth in England and cheap 
credit.  
Whilst fuelling short-term growth, the long-term 
implications of such trends pose risks to the 
medium term outlook for the UK. In their most 
recent Economic and Fiscal Outlook, the OBR 
have run a number of different scenarios for what 
may happen to the UK economy should 
consumers quickly reign back their spending.   
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Chart 7: Inflation projected to continue to rise sharply in 
2017 
 
 
Source: Bank of England, OBR & IMF  
 
 
Chart 8: Actual and planned business investment show 
signs of weakness as uncertainty bites 
 
Source: ONS, Business investment in the UK & BofE  
 
 
Chart 9: PMI for UK remains positive suggesting a strong 
start to 2017 
 
Source: IHS Markit 
* Above 50 = expansion of activity, below 50 = contraction. 
 
Whatever scenario occurs, the outlook for 
consumer spending is substantially weaker this 
year than last.  
The value of sterling is around 18% below its 
November 2015 peak, reflecting market 
perceptions that a lower exchange rate is needed 
IROORZLQJWKH8.¶s withdrawal from the EU.  
A consequence of weaker sterling is that higher 
import costs will cause inflation to overshoot the 
%DQNRI(QJODQG¶VWDUJHW,QIODWLRQURVHWR
in January and further increases are likely over the 
coming months. The Bank of England expect 
inflation to peak at 2.8% toward the end of this 
year. That being said, with significant uncertainty 
around how the UK economy might react to Brexit, 
the MPC appear reluctant to take any immediate 
decision to raise interest rates.  
Rising inflation coupled with moderation in pay 
growth as employment levels remains flat, is likely 
to mean materially weaker real income growth 
over the coming few years: another reason why 
consumer spending is likely to slow. 
Despite the depreciation in sterling, net trade has 
still acted as a drag on growth although it should 
have a positive impact ± albeit modest ± in the 
coming months.  
Unsurprisingly given heightened levels of 
uncertainty, actual levels of investment and 
measures of future intentions have weakened ± 
Chart 8. Overall, business investment in the UK fell 
LQ5HVXOWVIURPWKH%DQNRI(QJODQG¶V
Agents of investment planning also remain low ± 
although the figures did pick-up slightly in January 
2017.  
Despite these developments, the momentum 
established in late 2016, points to a positive 
outlook for early 2017. Up-to-date indicators of 
economic performance, including the IHS Markit 
PMI, remain above the cut-off of 50 which marks 
the boundary between expansion and contraction.   
The OBR predict growth of 0.6% in Q1 before 
slowing to 0.3% per quarter for the remainder of 
the year.  
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Table 4: OBR forecasts, Spring Budget 2017  
 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
GDP 1.8 2.0 1.6 1.7 1.9 
revision -0.2 -0.2 -0.5 -0.4 -0.2 
CPI Inflation 0.7 2.4 2.3 2.0 2.0 
revision 0.0 +0.8 +0.3 -0.1 0.0 
Unemployment (% 
rate) 
4.9 4.9 5.1 5.2 5.2 
revision -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
Source: OBR  
* Italics are change from March 2016 forecast 
 
 
Chart 10: Revisions to growth forecasts ± 2016: 2020/21 
 
Source: OBR 
 
 
Table 5: OBR forecast of nominal GDP (£ billion)  
 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20 2020/21 
March 17 1,964 2,029 2,095 2,168 2,251 
Nov 16 1,951 2,001 2,083 2,167 2,253 
Source: OBR  
 
 
Chart 11: Growth weaker as consumption tails off 
 
Source: OBR 
 
The UK Economic Outlook  
As highlighted above, the near term economic 
outlook for the UK economy has improved.  
Buoyed by robust consumer spending, most 
forecasters have revised up their predictions for 
growth in 2017.  
The OBR for example, are now forecasting that the 
UK economy will grow by 2.0% in 2017 ± higher 
than their forecast of 1.4% made back in the 
Autumn Statement in November.  
But these improvements are short-term and largely 
superficial. Although forecasts have been revised 
up for 2017, they have been revised down for 
2018, 2019 and 2020.  
As a result, UK national income is projected to be 
essentially unchanged by 2020 vis-à-vis what the 
OBR had forecast in November.  
Most economists still predict that growth will slow 
over the next couple of years as the economy 
adjusts to life outside the EU.  
Overall, despite recent media attention on the 
positive performance of the UK economy post EU 
referendum (relative to forecast), the underlying 
picture painted by the O%5¶VHFRQRPLFDQGILVFDO
outlook remains weak (and much poorer than 
before the referendum in June).  
Per capita GDP growth is forecast to average just 
1.2% over the coming years, well below its post-
war historic average.  
This time last year, the OBR forecast average real 
earnings would return above their 2008 peak by 
2020, but it now expects real earnings growth to 
be weak in 2017, and not return to the 2008-peak 
until 2021.  
Rising inflation is likely to make it particularly 
challenging for households exposed to rising food 
and fuel prices. It will also make it much more 
challenging for families reliant on working age 
benefits which continue to be frozen in cash terms.  
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Chart 12: Weak outlook for household incomes ± 
particularly in short-term (0% growth in 2017) 
 
Source: OBR 
 
 
Chart 13: Short-term revision to UK Government borrowing 
forecasts, but medium term trend remains 
 
Source: OBR 
 
 
Table 6: Budget Consequentials for Scotland  
 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20 2020/21 Total 
Consequentials announced in Budget 2017 
RDEL 124 85 51 n/a 260 
CDEL 21 22 24 23 90 
Consequentials as % SG totals (Autumn Statement 2016) 
RDEL 0.47% 0.32% 0.19% n/a 0.33% 
CDEL 0.68% 0.67% 0.68% 0.63% 0.66% 
Source: HM Treasury  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Spring Budget 
Earlier this month, the Chancellor delivered the 
final Spring Budget. Alongside the short-term good 
news on the economy, Phillip Hammond was able 
to report a downward revision in borrowing for the 
year.  
But again, this is short-lived. The OBR predict that 
the government is still on track to borrow £30bn 
per year more in 2020/21 than it intended in March 
last year.  
With public sector borrowing forecast to be around 
1% of GDP by 2019/20, the Chancellor has some 
µZULJJOH-URRP¶WRPHHWKLVILVFDOWDUJet (which is to 
reduce cyclically adjusted borrowing to no more 
than 2% of GDP by 2020/21). He may well need it. 
The forecasts are predicated on an improvement 
in productivity growth to 1.6% in 2017 and beyond 
± way above recent trends. 
The Budget was relatively thin on specific tax and 
spending announcements ± and even thinner by 
the time the Chancellor u-turned on his decision to 
change the tax treatment of self-employed 
workers.  
He did announce an additional £2bn spending on 
social care in England over three years; some 
additional spending on education; and moderate 
further increases in capital spending on top of 
those set out in November.  
The subsequent consequentials for Scotland 
amount to £350m over the course of the 
parliament ± £260m revenue and £90m capital. 
In the context of a planned real-terms cut of 
PLHDGMXVWHGIRULQIODWLRQLQ6FRWODQG¶V
resource budget between 2016/17 and 2019/20, 
an additional £260m in cash is not an insignificant 
boost. But spread over 3 years it does not alter the 
conclusion that Holyrood will face challenging real 
terms reductions up to the end of the decade.  
If the UK Government maintains its ambition to run 
a surplus in the next parliament, further cuts 
beyond 2020/21 are likely ± taking the period of 
consolidation to well over a decade.  
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Chart 14: Scottish vs. UK economic performance  
 
 Source: Scottish Government 
 
 
Chart 15: Average Scottish quarterly growth by time period 
(and by sector): Pre & post financial crisis 
 
 Source: Scottish Government, FAI calculations 
 
 
Chart 16: Decline in contribution of North Sea to Scottish 
GDP  
 
 Source: Scottish Government, FAI calculations 
 
  
 
Recent Scottish Economy Data 
In contrast to the relatively robust growth in the 
UK, the Scottish economy continues to grow much 
more slowly.   
Weak growth in any given quarter is not 
uncommon particularly as the Scottish series can 
be more volatile from time-to-time.  
But as Chart 14 highlights, there is little doubt that 
the most recent data is part of a sustained trend.  
We have now seen a year and a half of very muted 
RULQVRPH4¶VQRJURZWK7KH6FRWWLVKHFRQRP\
is believed to have grown by around 0.6% over the 
last year. To put this in context, average growth 
per quarter in 2014 was 0.7%! 
There are a number of drivers of these results. 
As we have discussed in the last two editions of 
the Fraser Economy Commentary, it is hard to 
move away from the conclusion that the on-going 
challenges in the North Sea are continuing to have 
a significant impact on the wider Scottish 
economy. 
Industries closely associated to the oil and gas 
supply chain, such as elements of manufacturing, 
have fallen sharply. Overall manufacturing is down 
over 7% over the last three years.  
To give an indication of the scale of the shock, 
Chart 16 plots the share of extra regio (which 
FDSWXUHV6FRWODQG¶VRLODQGJDVRXWSXWDVD
proportion of total Scottish GDP. The latest figures 
show a fall from a peak of around 18% in Q3 2008 
to just 5% in Q3 2016. We cannot expect a decline 
of this magnitude not to have a significant impact 
on the on-shore Scottish economy.  
There is some evidence however, that the 
slowdown may not just be limited to the oil and gas 
industry.  
For example, food and drink is down nearly 2% 
over the year, the computer and electrical products 
sector is down nearly 5%, textiles and clothing ± 
albeit a small sector ± is down nearly 10% and 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals down over 8%. 
0.0%
0.2%
0.4%
0.6%
0.8%
1.0%
1.2%
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3
2014 2015 2016
%
 c
h
a
n
g
e
 Q
 o
n
 Q
Scotland UK
-1.0%
-0.5%
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
2.5%
GDP Production Construction Services
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 Q
u
a
rt
e
rl
y
 G
ro
w
th
1999 to 2006 2007 to 2012 2013 to 2014 2015 to 2016
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
20%
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
%
 G
D
P
 (
in
c
lu
d
in
g
 g
e
o
g
ra
p
h
ic
a
l 
s
h
a
re
 o
f 
N
S
)
Extra-regio as share of
Scottish GDP
Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary, March 2017  
12 
 
Chart 17: Scottish vs. UK performance by sector over year 
to Q3 2016 
 
 Source: Scottish Government, FAI Calculations 
 
 
Chart 18: Construction output (nominal): New Work 
 
Source: ONS, Output in the construction industry 
 
 
Chart 19: Composition of Q3 2016 growth  
 
Source: Scottish Government 
 
  
 
Overall, in only three of the major classifications of 
sectors ± agriculture, water and waste 
management and businesses services and finance 
± has Scotland outperformed the UK over the year.  
Construction continues to act as a drag on overall 
Scottish growth ± with the sector down nearly 6% 
over the year.  
As we first discussed in the July Commentary, this 
appears to be part of an adjustment back to more 
normal levels of activity. Construction grew by over 
30% between the start of 2014 and the end of 
2015.  
We remain somewhat puzzled by the scale of this 
growth ± as the chart highlights the increase 
appears to have been driven by a significant boost 
in infrastructure spending. Whilst a large number 
of projects were delivered during this time, the 
speed of increase and subsequent fall-back 
suggests that some classification/reporting issues 
may be part of the explanation.  
The growth that does exist in the Scottish 
economy continues to be coming through the all-
important services sector (which makes up around 
75% of the total economy). In contrast to other 
parts of the economy, the services sector has now 
grown in each and every quarter since mid-2015. 
This is supported, in part, by relatively strong 
growth in retail and wholesale reflecting a 
continued robust uptick in consumer spending. It is 
also driven by a sharp rise in financial and 
insurance activities which are up over 12% on the 
year. 
All that being said, despite this relatively healthy 
performance in services, one of the explanations 
why Scotland has lagged the UK is because the 
UK service sector has been growing even more 
strongly.  
Over the year as a whole, UK services are up 
3.1% compared to growth of 2.1% in Scotland.  
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Chart 20: Expenditure components of nominal GDP ± 
households remain most important factor  
 
Source: Scottish Government 
 
 
Chart 21: Ongoing challenges with Scottish exports ± 
falling manufactured exports for 6 quarters 
 
Source: ONS 
 
 
Chart 22: House prices remain relatively flat in Scotland ± 
up just 2½% since start of 2014  
 
Source: Nationwide 
 
 
Similar to that in the UK, household spending has 
continued to make a sustained positive 
contribution to overall growth in recent times. 
Indeed, it was by far the greatest source of 
nominal growth in Q3 2016.  
Investment (Gross Fixed Capital Formation) fell 
back somewhat after relatively strong growth in 
Q2.    
The contribution from net trade was positive once 
again during the quarter but this comes on the 
back of overall weak performance.  
Statistics shows that manufactured exports are 
down 8% on the year. Engineering exports ± which 
make up around 1/3 of total manufactured exports 
± have fallen nearly 14% since the start of 2015.   
2YHUDOO6FRWODQG¶VZHDNH[SRUWSHUIRUPDQFH
remains a concern and a key challenge for 
policymakers. Brexit, at least in the short-run, is 
only going to make tackling these issues even 
harder.   
6FRWODQG¶VHVWLPDWHGVDYLQJUDWLRUHPDLQVORZ± 
and fell again in Q3 2016. If this reflects some 
households using up savings in order to support 
consumption, and before inflation and employment 
prospects become more uncertain, then it may not 
bode well for future growth prospects.  
It is unsurprising therefore that we have failed to 
see much in the way of growth in house prices in 
recent times. Prices are only up around 2% on 
2014 levels.  
This does however, hide a significant degree of 
variability across the country. House prices in 
Edinburgh continue to grow significantly, whereas 
Aberdeen and surrounding areas have been 
seeing much more muted growth (and even falling 
prices on occasion). In contrast, UK house prices 
are up 15% over the same period. Muted house 
price growth may have an impact on consumer 
confidence in Scotland.   
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Chart 23: 6FRWODQG¶V5HFHQW3URGXFWLYLW\3HUIRUPDQFH 
 
 Source: Scottish Government 
 
 
Chart 24: Productivity still below trend 
 
 Source: ONS and FAI calculations 
 
 
Chart 25: International Productivity Performance (UK = 
100): 2015 
 
 Source: ONS and FAI calculations 
 
  
 
Productivity Statistics 
6LQFH'HFHPEHU¶V&RPPHQWDU\ZHKDYHQHZ
data on productivity in Scotland.  
This showed growth in labour productivity of 3.5% 
in 2015. So have we finally turned the corner in 
WHUPVRIERRVWLQJ6FRWODQG¶VORQJ-term economic 
potential? In short, no.  
Productivity growth is fundamental to the long-term 
health of an economy. If we can produce more 
output (or better quality output) whilst still working 
the same hours then we will be better off.  
On a positive note, the gap between Scotland and 
the UK has closed. ,Q6FRWODQG¶VODERXU
productivity (in current prices) was around 95.8% 
of the UK equivalent figure whereas now it is 
99.9%. Productivity in Scotland is now around 
9.4% higher than it was in 2007 ± although it is still 
well below where it would have been had it 
remained on trend (Chart 24). 
But the rise in productivity in 2015 follows 4 years 
of weak (and sometimes falling) productivity. To an 
extent, the increase appears to be a one-off 
bounce back rather than evidence of a sustained 
improvement.  
FuUWKHUPRUHWKH8.¶VRZQSURGXFWLYLW\
performance remains poor. As the chart highlights, 
UK productivity is around 20% lower than the G7 
average (and well below the US, France and 
Germany). So catching up with the weak 
performance of the UK is nothing to write home 
about.  
At the same time, some of the growth this year 
appears to be driven ± not from us producing more 
± but working less to produce the same amount! 
This is because hours worked fell in 2015.  
And whatever happened in 2015, we know that 
with growth in 2016 ± on the measure used in 
productivity calculations ± likely to come in around 
0.6%, and rising (or at least flat) hours worked, 
6FRWODQG¶VSURGXFWLYLW\LVOLNHO\WRKDYHIDOOHQODVW
year rather than increased.  
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Chart 26: Employment & Unemployment: Nov-Jan 2017 
 
Source: ONS, Labour Force Survey 
 
 
Chart 27: Inactivity Rates: change over year: Nov-Jan 2017 
 
Source: ONS, Labour Force Survey 
 
 
Chart 28: Employment rate changes by age bracket since 
2007 
 
Source: ONS, Labour Force Survey 
 
  
 
The Scottish labour market 
With relatively fragile data across the economy as 
a whole, it is no surprise that the Scottish labour 
market has weakened over the last year.  
Employment is down 21,000 over the 12 months to 
end January. The Scottish employment rate of 
73.7% is just under a percentage point lower than 
the UK rate of 74.6%. But as Chart 26 highlights, 
the employment rate in Scotland is still relatively 
robust and near its pre-financial crisis peak. 
Overall, the Scottish labour market seems to have 
held up well despite the recent differences in 
growth rates with the UK.  
Indeed, the most recent data published in 
February showed a rise in employment of 16,000 
over the quarter with a similar fall in 
unemployment.  
One feature that continues to come through from 
the annual picture is that whilst unemployment has 
fallen sharply, this has been driven ± not by people 
finding work ± but by a rise in levels of economic 
inactivity ± Chart 27.  
Our Scottish Labour Market Trends report, which 
we publish jointly with the Scottish Centre for 
Employment Research, provides a detailed 
analysis of developments in the labour market.  
One theme this quarter was to monitor how 
Scotland ± and different parts of the country ± 
have fared since the global financial crisis. This 
analysis highlighted that whilst Scotland entered 
the financial crisis in a relatively healthier labour 
market position than the UK as a whole, it has not 
bounced back to the same extent.  
Since 2007, of the different age groups, 
employment rates amongst older workers have 
increased ± both in terms of those aged 50-64 and 
65+. This has not been the case for most young 
workers. This ageing of the workforce is likely to 
be part of a more sustained trend and raises some 
important issues about the long-term structure of 
the labour market, and the potential implications 
for young people seeking work.  
69
71
73
75
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
5
2
0
1
6
2
0
1
7
E
m
p
lo
y
e
m
n
t 
R
a
te
 (
1
6
-6
4
)
U
n
e
m
p
lo
y
e
m
n
t 
R
a
te
 (
1
6
+
)
Unemployment Rate (LHS)
Employment Rate (RHS)
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
England Wales Scotland Northern Ireland UK
C
h
a
n
g
e
 i
n
 R
a
te
 o
v
e
r 
y
e
a
r 
(%
 p
o
in
t)
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
2007 Q1 2010 Q2 2013 Q3 2016 Q4
In
d
e
x,
 2
0
0
7
 p
e
a
k(
 b
y
 a
g
e
 )
 =
 0
16-24 25 - 34 35 - 49 50 - 64 65+
Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary, March 2017  
16 
 
Chart 29: RBS/FAI Business Monitor shows some tentative 
signs of improved conditions  
 
 Source: Fraser of Allander/RBS Scottish Business Monitor 
 
 
Chart 30: PMI: Scotland lags the UK 
 
 Source: IHS Markit 
 
 
Chart 31: Consumer Confidence remains negative in 
Scotland and gap with UK widening 
 
 Source: GfK Research 
 
 
Outlook  
There has arguably never been a time in recent 
history where the range of key fundamental 
economic policy questions facing Scotland have 
been so uncertain.  
How these issues ± and in particular, the Brexit 
negotiations and prospects of an independence 
referendum ± play out will have a material impact 
on the outlook for the Scottish economy. 
This is not to say that one particular outcome is 
better than the other. It is simply to make the point 
that with uncertainty of such a magnitude now in 
play, we cannot expect these processes 
themselves ± irrespective of the end result ± not to 
have an impact.  
This uncertainty comes at a time when some of the 
emerging indicators picking up business trading 
conditions have been starting to show a degree of 
positivity.     
For example, the latest RBS Scottish Business 
Monitor for the final quarter of 2016 contained 
some evidence of renewed optimism in the 
Scottish economy. The balance of firms reporting a 
pick-up in new business rose relatively sharply. At 
the same time, whilst those reporting a change in 
repeat business remain negative, it was up on Q3.    
The Bank of Scotland IHS Markit PMI for February 
reported that business activity in Scotland had 
increased at its fastest rate since July 2015. The 
figure of 51.2 is still below the equivalent figure for 
the UK but it does suggest that growth is picking 
up as we move into 2017.  
In contrast to the slightly more positive sentiment 
within the business community, levels of consumer 
confidence in Scotland have continued to slide.  
The GfK Consumer Confidence Index (where 0 = 
balance) fell to -18 in February. Well below the 
same index in the UK (which whilst also negative 
was -6).  
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Chart 32: Confidence negative across all income bands ± 
although pessimism highest amongst low earners 
 
 Source: GfK Research 
 
 
Chart 33: Key driver of lower consumer confidence appears 
to be deterioration in expectations for economic outlook  
 
 Source: Scottish Government 
 
 
Chart 34: Fall in retail sales index ± Q4 2016  
 
 Source: Scottish Government 
 
 
 
Unpicking the headline results, we see that 
confidence is weakest amongst those on the 
lowest household earnings.  
This may in part reflect their exposure to recent 
pressures on welfare benefits and higher food 
prices. Overall however, all income groups 
reported a negative result.  
One possible explanation for this outlook is the 
sharp fall in the expectations that households have 
for the economy in the foreseeable future. The 
6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VRZQFRQVXPHUFRQILGHQFH
index points to a sharp weakening in expectations 
about the economy (Chart 33).  
Given the share scale of household spending in 
the economy, this loss in confidence does not 
bode well for future growth in Scotland.  
$XVHIXOµVRIW-LQGLFDWRU¶IRUODERXUPDUNHW
conditions is the IHS Markit Jobs Report. The most 
recent edition showed that 2016 finished on a 
weak footing, with falls in both permanent and 
temporary posts, but February was more 
promising. 
With such overall weakness in consumer 
confidence, it is of no surprise that retail sales fell 
in the final quarter of 2016 ± albeit on the back of 
relatively robust growth in recent months.    
 
Table 7: Permanent Staff Placements 
 µQRFKDQJH¶ Scotland 
Index 
UK 
Index 
2016   
Sep 55.2 51.0 
Oct 49.8 54.6 
Nov 49.1 55.6 
Dec 45.6 55.2 
2017   
Jan 45.7 54.5 
Feb 51.6 56.1 
Source: IHS Markit 
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Table 8: Latest growth forecasts for the UK economy  
 2017 2018 2019 
Bank of England 2.0 1.6 1.7 
OBR 2.0 1.6 1.7 
NIESR 1.7 1.9 2.1 
European Commission 1.5 1.2 n/a 
IMF 1.1 1.7 1.8 
Oxford Economics 1.6 1.3 1.6 
ITEM Club 1.3 1.4 1.6 
CBI 1.3 n/a n/a 
Source: HM Treasury 
 
 
Table 9: Nowcasts for Q42016 and Q12017 for Scotland 
 Q4 Q1 
Quarterly Growth +0.42 +0.38 
Annualised Growth +1.69 +1.55 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute 
 
Table 10: FAI forecast Scottish GVA growth (%) 2017 to 
2019 
 
2017 2018 2019 
GVA 1.2 1.3 1.4 
Production 1.4 1.5 1.6 
Construction 0.7 0.8 0.8 
Services 1.2 1.3 1.4 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute 
 
 
Chart 35: Growth to remain below trend through forecast 
 
 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute 
* Actual data to Q3 2016, central forecast with forecast uncertainty 
for 2017 ± 2019 
Uncertainty bands sourced from accuracy of past forecasts at 
different forecast horizons 
 
 
Our forecasts 
Forecasting the immediate outlook for growth in 
these times of heightened political uncertainty 
remains challenging.  
Table 8 highlights how most independent 
forecasters predict that the pace of growth will 
ease over the next few years in the UK.  
Our nowcasts ± which make use of a wide variety 
of data sources, including the latest business 
surveys ± suggest that the Scottish economy 
remains on track to record growth in the first 
quarter of 2017. Growth of 0.4% would be higher 
than we have seen in recent quarters.  
In looking further forward, as in the past, we report 
a central forecast but calculate uncertainty bands 
to set out a likely range within which we predict 
Scottish GDP will lie. In our view, it is this range 
that should be just as much the focus of discussion 
as specific point estimates.  
In other words, it is entirely possible that the 
Scottish economy could grow close to 2% this 
year, but our assessment is that the probability of 
that happening is lower than our central projection.  
Two major judgement calls are required in making 
these forecasts.  
The first concerns the outlook for the North Sea. 
Recent developments in the global supply of oil 
suggest that there is little prospect of a return to 
higher prices in the near future.  
The implications for the oil and gas sector in the 
North Sea means that this is likely to continue to 
act as a brake on Scottish growth vis-à-vis the UK. 
However, after nearly 2½ years of retrenchment 
the impact at a macro level will start to be reduced.  
The second relates to any impact of the major 
political developments on the wider economy. 
Since the Brexit referendum, despite heightened 
levels of business uncertainty, levels of day-to-day 
activity have held up remarkably well.  
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Table 11: FAI revised forecast %-point change from 
December 2017 forecast by sector, 2017 to 2019 
 
2017 2018 2019 
GVA +0.04 +0.05 -0.17 
Production +0.06 -0.01 -0.18 
Construction +0.02 +0.07 -0.11 
Services +0.04 +0.07 -0.17 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute 
 
 
Chart 36: Contribution to forecast  
 
 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute 
 
 
Table 12: FAI labour market forecast to 2019 
 
2017 2018 2019 
Employee Jobs 2,434,650 2,474,650 2,508,100 
% employee job 
growth over 
year 
+0.3% +1.6 +1.4 
ILO 
unemployment 131,900 141,350 166,300 
Rate (%)1 5.0 5.3 6.1 
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute 
Notes:  
Absolute numbers are rounded to the nearest 50.  
1 Rate calculated as total ILO unemployment divided by total of 
economically active population aged 16 and over. 
 
 
 
 
 
However, many businesses remain on edge. If the 
negotiations start badly then this could lead to a 
more serious loss in economic sentiment with 
implications for investment, spending and growth.  
At the same time, we await how businesses will 
react in Scotland to the prospects of a 2nd 
independence referendum.  
The next 3 years ± 2017, 2018 & 2019 
Our central forecast is for growth to remain at 
around the same pace in 2017 as in 2016 ± with 
growth of 1.2% (up on our December forecast of 
1.1%).  
We have broadly maintained our forecast of 
growth of 1.3% growth in 2018 but revised down 
slightly our outlook for 2019 to 1.4% (down from 
1.6% in December). These revisions are driven, in 
part, by the new weaker projections for the UK 
economy which in turn spill-over into Scotland 
through the strong trade linkages.  
Whilst positive, the outlook remains fragile and 
well below trend. The service sector will remain the 
dominant source of growth.   
On the components of demand, we expect the 
heightened uncertainty to dampen investment this 
year. Some of this will reflect delayed plans as 
firms await the details of the Brexit negotiations. 
Once this is resolved, a pick-up is likely toward the 
end of the forecast period. As the greatest 
component of GDP, consumption will remain the 
biggest contributor, although it will be lower than it 
otherwise would have been as higher inflation, 
combined with low earnings growth, feeds through 
to household spending.  
Net exports will continue to benefit from the 
depreciation in Sterling as will tourism.   
We expect unemployment to return toward a level 
consistent with medium-term trends (although still 
well below its long-term average). As we 
highlighted above, recent unemployment numbers 
have been skewed by a sharp rise in inactivity. To 
WKHH[WHQWWKDWWKLVLVUHYHUVHG6FRWODQG¶V
unemployment rate could rise much more sharply.  
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2.0
2017 2018 2019
%
 c
o
n
tr
ib
u
ti
o
n
 t
o
 G
D
P
 g
ro
w
th
Households Government Investment Trade GDP Growth
Fraser of Allander Institute Economic Commentary, March 2017  
20 
 
Diagram 1: Independence macroeconomic issues  
 
Table 13: The currency options 
£  Formal currency union 
 Informal currency union (Sterlingisation) 
Scottish £ Pegged to UK£ or basket of currencies 
 Floating 
Euro Formal currency union 
Source: FAI 
 
 
Chart 37: 6FRWODQG¶V1RUWK6HD5HYHQXHV 
 
 Source: Scottish Government, GERS, OBR and FAI calculations 
 
 
Chart 38: 6FRWODQG¶VHVWLPDWHGQHWERUURZLQJ 
 
 Source: Scottish Government, GERS 
 
Policy Context 
On 13th March, the First Minister announced plans 
to hold a second independence referendum. The 
UK Government has so far rejected the timing of 
any vote, but it seems increasingly likely that one 
will be held at some point.  
It is clear that the economic arguments will ± once 
again ± dominate the debate.  
The key issues are well known. In the coming 
months, the Scottish Government will need to set 
out a robust macroeconomic framework covering 
the key areas of: monetary policy & currency, 
financial regulation (including contingency for its 
banks) and fiscal policy (and crucially, the 
management of any borrowing and debt that 
Scotland would inherit).  
We will return to each of these areas in greater 
depth in future work. We will shortly be providing 
details of a series of public events looking at the 
economic choices now facing Scotland.   
Whilst the key issues are clear, the arguments this 
time are likely to be different.  
Firstly, in 2014 there was a clear choice between a 
µVWDWXVTXR¶± albeit with more devolved powers ± 
and independence. With Brexit, the debate will be 
set against the backdrop of two types of economic 
change. 
Secondly, it is undoubtedly the case that the 
recent challenges in the North Sea poses a 
challenge to any transition to independence. For 
example, the sharp fall in oil prices has 
significantly lowered North Sea tax revenues.  
Forecasts are now in the order of hundreds of 
PLOOLRQVUDWKHUWKDQELOOLRQVRI¶V*LYHQLWV
maturity, the UKCS is unlikely to be a rich source 
of tax revenue in the years ahead.  This has led to 
DZHDNHQLQJLQ6FRWODQG¶VHVWLPDWHGILVFDOSRVLWLRQ
± according to GERS ± with the deficit in 2015-16 
around 9.5%. Assuming similar levels of growth 
and current patterns of public spending, our own 
projections suggest that the deficit will remain in 
the 6% to 7% range by 2020.  
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Table 14: 6FRWODQG¶V*'33HU&DSLWD 
 2015 GDP per 
head ($PPP) 
Rank 
Luxembourg* 102,131 1 
Ireland* 68,481 2 
Switzerland 62,500 3 
Norway 62,025 4 
United States 56,066 5 
Netherlands 49,570 6 
Austria 49,440 7 
Denmark 48,994 8 
Germany 47,999 9 
Sweden 47,823 10 
Scotland (geo. share of oil) 42,372  
UK 41,779 16 
Scotland (pop. share of oil) 40,001  
Source: OECD, Scottish Government & FAI calculations 
* Interpreting GDP per head figures is fraught with difficulty ± 
particularly for countries such as Lux/Ire where statistics of what 
they produce differs from actual income.  
 
 
Chart 39: Devolved tax powers ± but are they enough? 
 
 Source: Scottish Government, GERS 
 
 
Chart 40: Scottish export markets 
 
 Source: Scottish Government 
 
GERS tells us little about the long-term public 
finances of an independent Scotland given that, by 
definition, it is based upon estimates of public 
spending and revenue in Scotland as part of the 
UK. That being said, the Scottish Government will 
be required to set out a clear plan for how it 
intends to manage the very challenging starting 
position set out in GERS.  
7KLUGO\PDQ\RIWKRVHRQWKHµ\HV¶VLGHLQ
argued that there would be a degree of continuity 
between the then status quo and independence; 
e.g. plans to keep sterling, existing financial 
regulations and for both to be members of the EU.  
1RZWKRXJKWKH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VFDVH
appears to be framed around Scotland pro-actively 
taking a different path to the UK (e.g. on EU). This 
being the case, it is possible that the economic 
proposition could be more radical on issues such 
as currency, financial regulation and fiscal policy.  
The Scottish Government will undoubtedly make 
the case that Scotland is an advanced economy 
and comparable in size to other successful 
countries but that the levers of independence 
provide an opportunity to do things differently. The 
UK Government will counter that Scotland now has 
substantial economic powers, and gains from an 
established macroeconomic structure and the 
pooling of resources across the UK.  
The trigger for the referendum was, in the First 
0LQLVWHU¶VYLHZWKHGHFLVLRQRIWKH8.
Government to seek a so-FDOOHGµKDUG¶%UH[LW 
Our own work has shown that EU membership is 
indeed very important for Scotland and Brexit will 
no doubt act as a key long-term headwind to 
growth prospects across the whole of the UK. As 
&KDUWKLJKOLJKWVKRZHYHU6FRWODQG¶VWUDGHZLWK
the rest of the UK is over four times larger than 
trade with the EU so a clear strategy for supporting 
trade with the UK will be crucial.  
As highlighted above, even under favourable trade 
UHJLPHV6FRWODQG¶VH[SRUWSHUIRUPDQFHKDVEHHQ
unspectacular in recent years. Any change which 
makes trade more difficult will only make this 
worse.    
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Chart 41: 6FRWODQGDQGU8.¶VSRSXODWLRQSURMHFWLRQV 
 
 
 Source: ONS 
 
Chart 42: UK economic policy uncertainty based upon 
newspaper articles of policy uncertainty 
 
 Source: www.policyuncertainty.com  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Migration is also likely to feature in the debate. 
Historically population growth in Scotland has 
been far below that of the UK and other European 
countries with a similar population to Scotland.   
As Chart 41 shows, even with current projections 
for migraWLRQ6FRWODQG¶VZRUNLQJDJHSRSXODWLRQLV
projected to decline over the next few decades. If a 
µKDUG%UH[LW¶ZDVWROLPLWWKHQXPEHURISHRSOH
coming to Scotland, the consequences for the 
economy and public services could be significant.   
In 2014, the case was made for Scotland to remain 
in a formal currency union with the UK. Whether 
this is the best option in the long-run and whether 
or not the UK would agree to it, is open to debate.  
That being said, the challenges with implementing 
a new currency ± including any redenomination of 
contracts, investments and mortgages, the 
capitalisation of banks and managing any market 
volatility ± should not be underestimated. All of 
which would also need to be set in the context of a 
stable and credible macroeconomic framework. 
Whatever the views are over the long-term risks 
and opportunities from independence, it is clear 
that we are entering an unprecedented period of 
political and economic uncertainty. With an 
economy struggling with the effects of a low oil 
price, the uncertainty caused by ongoing Brexit 
negotiations and a second independence 
referendum is likely to act as a further headwind 
for many businesses and potential investors.  
Just as it is the responsibility of the UK 
Government to provide clarity through the Brexit 
process, it is incumbent on the Scottish 
Government to do likewise around independence 
and to re-double their efforts to support the 
Scottish economy through these unprecedented 
times.  
For regular analysis on the Scottish economy and public finances please see our blog: 
www.fraserofallander.org 
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